Abstract-The philosophy upon which the Internet was built places the intelligence close to the edge. As the Internet has matured, intermediate devices or middleboxes, such as firewalls or application gateways, have been introduced, thereby weakening the end-to-end nature of the network. As a result, applications must often modify their behavior to accommodate the middleboxes. This is is especially true in the case of transient failure of stateful devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
A guiding principle in the design of the Internet has been that network communication is end-to-end and that network intelligence should be as close to the resources on the edge as possible [1] . Because of this, the capacity of the Internet has scaled well with the rapid growth in the number of devices. As the Internet has grown and matured, however, it has been necessary to introduce intelligent intermediate devices, such as firewalls or application gateways, hence weakening the end-to-end nature of the network. Although these intermediate devices weaken the notion of end-to-end connections, they are necessary for operational or functional reasons. Nevertheless, intelligent intermediate devices reduce the network transparency for end hosts and their applications, requiring the end hosts to make decisions that accommodate the intermediate devices. With the proliferation of intelligent devices in the network, the likelihood that communication will be interrupted has increased.
When we refer to middleboxes in this paper, we are referring specifically to devices that record TCP state and use that state to affect future decisions. Many of the middleboxes mentioned in RFC 3234 [2] fall into this category. When a middlebox fails, it loses the state it maintained on behalf of ongoing communication. Upon restoration of the middlebox, established TCP connections have no corresponding state and are rejected. Even if the fault is transient, the applications on the end host have no recourse but to try to re-establish communication or to pass the problem on to the user. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. In the former case, each application needs to be written to handle middlebox failure. While burdensome, it is preferable to the latter case where responsibility for handling the failure is passed to the user who is not even aware of the existence of middleboxes.
While restarting applications causes an annoyance to some, for some industries this represents significant lost opportunity. The banking industry in particular must balance the concerns of resilience with security. As an element of security, banks deploy network firewalls. However, to protect against equipment failure, firewalls are deployed in state-sharing pairs. While possible when the firewalls are co-located, this does not protect against building or power failures. In this case, physically diverse pairs are deployed, but these cannot share state due to the distance and reliability of the networks between. Compounding this problem is the fact that each entity has its own set of firewalls and application communication may involve multiple entities. Hence, an application is vulnerable to any firewall pair within its communication context failing. Significant revenue can be lost during the time taken to restart applications, but a greater risk to revenue is that clients move "to competitors at the first sign that [the] company's infrastructure [is] down" [3] .
In this work, we examine the problem of recovering from transient middlebox failures, and to the greatest extent possible, insulating the application (and thereby the user) from these failures. This problem belongs to the general class of problems of providing higher-level end-to-end network services. We refer the reader to Section V for examples.
We evaluate our solution primarily on backward compatibility with legacy TCP and the principle that the protocol should increase functionality without decreasing performance. Users should not perceive any change in performance either in the connection establishment phase or during data transfer. We do not consider the impact of recovery from a transient middlebox failure on overall data transfer performance as this condition is an exception to normal operation. However, we do examine the minimum time required to recover a broken connection.
Protocols already exist that would allow us to restart a TCP connection [4] . However, instead of limiting our solution to a few problems, we introduce a mechanism, which we call an isolation boundary, that places a TCP connection in the context of a transport independent flow (TI-flow). This mechanism decouples the abstract flow from the underlying TCP, thereby making the solution applicable to other higherlevel end-to-end network services.
In the work presented here, however, we only examine the case of recovering from transient middlebox failures. The isolation boundary keeps track of where TCP is in the context of the TI-flow so a new TCP connection can be created and communication restored in the event of a transient failure without the application -or more importantly, the user -becoming aware. Most important of all, our approach maintains backward compatibility with existing devices, thus allowing incremental adoption.
In Section II, we introduce the conceptual basis upon which the isolation boundary rests. Section III discusses the proposed extensions to TCP that provides the isolation boundary mechanism, and Section IV touches upon our implementation and evaluates its compatibility and performance. Section V places our work in the broader context, and Section VI concludes with a discussion of future work.
II. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN

A. Logical Construct
It is well established that middleboxes today are an "Internet fact of life" [5] , nevertheless it is also accepted that they break the end-to-end semantics assumed by typical applications. This is because the middleboxes maintain state and interact in the conversation, often transparently to the end systems. While we acknowledge that middleboxes provide some benefits, the liability is that when they fail, connections being carried through them are also broken.
Here we address this challenge by developing the notion of an abstract flow, specifically a transport-independent flow (TI-flow) that represents the abstract communication between applications, independent of the underlying transport protocols. For this purpose, we define the notion of an isolation boundary, which allows us to maintain end-to-end semantics at an abstract level, without precluding middleboxes. To create an abstraction of TCP we must maintain TCP's semantics of reliable, in-order delivery of data and we must maintain an identity independent of the addressing that TCP uses to identify a connection. We call the independent identifier a transport-independent flow identifier (TIFID).
In order to be backward compatible, the TI-flow capability must be negotiated out-of-band from TCP's data stream. To have the least performance impact, maintenance of the TIflow capability should also happen out-of-band from TCP's data stream. We use TCP options to establish and maintain the placement of a TCP connection within the context of the TI-flow. The isolation boundary leverages support from TCP by delegating the tasks of reliable, in-order delivery and the description of the sequence space. However, to implicitly maintain the end-to-end semantics for the flow abstraction, we define an abstract sequence space. 1 The data in each TCP connection is then mapped into this sequence space as a part of placing the TCP connection in the context of the transport-independent flow. An implementation could reuse TCP's sequence space directly. However, this would create additional coupling to TCP limiting the TI-flow as a general mechanism. Additionally, the reuse of state between TCP connections would make TCP more vulnerable to hijacking. All that is required is to describe how each TCP connection fits into the overall context of the TI-flow. It is sufficient to establish this mapping during TCP's synchronization phase. Once the mapping is established, progress through TCP's sequence space implies progress through the transport-independent sequence space. Note that the mechanism of defining the TIflow does not imply maintaining distributed state. Since we delegate the task of maintaining distributed state to TCP and only synchronize the abstraction with TCP's semantics at the time of setup, the overhead during setup is expected to be negligible.
Leveraging TCP options and keeping pace with TCP's sequence space required us to implement the isolation boundary in the kernel, e.g., FreeBSD. With a user-library implementation, we would have needed to develop a mechanism to probe whether the communicating peer had support for such flow abstractions. Any probe protocol would ultimately have to resort to timeouts to infer the lack of support. Unlike the userlibrary implementation, the presence of custom options in the SYN+ACK message would indicate support, while absence would indicate lack of support, thus eliminating the need for any heuristics. The discovery of end-to-end support can happen alongside connection setup, thus allowing the kernel implementation to avoid probing and be backward compatible at the same time. Since the isolation boundary plays its role only when a new transport flow is setup and does not interfere with the critical data path, the overhead during transport is expected to be negligible.
B. Practical Details
With the logical construct defined above, we now study the details of creating an implementation. A critical aspect that must be considered for a practical implementation is the amount of data required to convey the context of the TI-flow in the TCP option field. Another important aspect is the question of security. The introduction of the flow option should not compromise TCP's security characteristics.
TCP options may be used during the TCP SYN phase to reliably exchange a unique flow identifier, the TIFID, and the mapping between the transport-independent sequence space and TCP's sequence space. We discuss the protocol for selecting the flow identifier and populating the transportindependent sequence numbers in Section III.
Before we further discuss the practical details, we need to acknowledge the constraints of using custom TCP options 30  29  28  27  26  25  24  23  22  21  20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  12  11  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2 to exchange the transport-independent flow identifier and the transport-independent sequence numbers, e.g., space availability in the TCP header. When the TCP SYN flag is set the following options need to be supported: maximum segment size (RFC793, four octets), window scaling (RFC1323, three octets), selective acknowledgement permitted (RFC2018, two octets), and time stamp (RFC1323, ten octets). This leaves us with 21 octets, although most implementations will only leave 20 octets due to field alignment. Because of this limited TCP option space, not all options can be supported simultaneously.
(We discuss the details of these unsupported options in our preliminary work [6] .) The size of the transport-independent sequence space should be at least as big as TCP's sequence space (32 bits). Any smaller would create problems in the mapping between the two spaces during TCP's synchronization phase. Having more space allows the issue of TCP sequence space wrap-around over high-speed links to be addressed as a future concern. Larger spaces for both the transport-independent sequence space and the TIFID will decrease the vulnerability of the TI-flow to session hijacking, which is also covered in more detail in our preliminary work [6] . Because the upper bound on sizes is dictated by the remaining space for TCP options, we chose the upper bound for each field, i.e., TIFID, sequence number, and acknowledgement number, to be 48 bits each for a total of 18 bytes. Other than to note these bounds on fields sizes, we do not explore the problem of ideal size in any more depth in this work.
III. EXTENDING TCP
The TCP header, shown in Figure 1 , consists of 20 octets for fields that must be present in all TCP headers, followed by up to 40 octets of options. We extend TCP by creating a transport-independent flow option, which is only valid during connection setup. The option consists of three 48-bit fields, as shown, in addition to the option tag and the length.
The first field contains the transport-independent flow identifier (TIFID), which provides the layer of indirection needed for the isolation boundary by labeling a flow independent of the underlying transport. The TIFID is an opaque identifier that is unique within the context of the two end hosts. A straightforward way to specify a TIFID with the correct properties is for the requesting process to specify a locally unique value for the first half of the TIFID in the initial SYN packet (TIFID 1 through TIFID 3 ) and the responding process to specify a locally unique value for the second half in the SYN-ACK packet (TIFID 4 through TIFID 6 ). As with TCP initial sequence numbers, both halves of the TIFID should be selected at random to guard against connection hijacking. Finally, the second half of the TIFID is zero during the time that the TIFID is partially specified, i.e., in the SYN packet.
By itself, the TIFID is insufficient to allow resynchronization when the underlying transport fails. The missing information is the position within transport-independent flow. Thus, there are two additional fields in the flow option indicating the next byte to be sent, i.e., the transport-independent sequence number (TISeq), and the last byte received, i.e., the transport-independent acknowledgement number (TIAck). As with traditional TCP, the two end points select an initial TISeq during the three-way handshake and each returns a TIAck to acknowledge the receipt of a SYN packet. Unlike TCP, the SYN bit does not need to be acknowledged because that is TCP's responsibility. When not defined, such as during the first phase of the three-way handshake, a TIAck is zero.
The TISeq are mapped onto the protocol-dependent sequence numbers of the underlying (TCP) transport and remain synchronized with them as long as the transport connection is active. The TISeq progresses through its space in a manner that is consistent with the transport sequence number being incremented. Because of the implicit synchronization, there is no need to explicitly send the TISeq and TIAck numbers after the three-way handshake. Figure 2 shows a sequence diagram of connection establishment. The initiator of communication, Peer A , defines the first half of the flow identifier, TIFID A , and initializes the second half to zero. Peer A also selects a random initial TISeq number, TISeq A , and establishes a mapping between TISeq A and the initial TCP sequence number. (TIAck A is set to zero.) It then sends a SYN packet with a flow option containing these values. Peer B defines the second half of the TIFID, TIFID B , using a random value and selects a random initial TISeq number, TISeq B . It acknowledges receipt of the SYN packet by setting TIAck B =TISeq A . It then sends a SYN+ACK packet with a flow option containing these values. Upon receipt of the reply, Peer A notes the value of the completed TIFID, which uniquely identifies the flow. It then returns an ACK packet containing the completed TIFID, its established TISeq A , and a TIAck A = TISeq B acknowledging the SYN+ACK packet as the final phase of the three-way handshake. Finally, Peer B validates that its SYN packet was received by checking TIAck A . At this point, transport-independent flows in each direction have been established, along with the associated bidirectional TCP connections. 
A. Connection Establishment
B. Connection Re-establishment
The failure of a middlebox in the network causes the logical end-to-end connections passing through it to also fail. Even though the connection failed, the isolation boundary maintains the position within the application data streams in each direction, via TISeq and TIAck, so that the transport can resume in the correct place once a new TCP connection is established.
The procedure for resuming operation after disconnection is the same as for creating a new connection except the previously completed TIFID, signified by a second half not equal to zero, is used instead. Since the TIFID is already complete, the receiving stack looks up the isolation boundary information corresponding to the complete TIFID and creates a new TCP connection upon which to resume the sending of application data. The exchange of SYN and SYN+ACK packets in this case allows the stacks to re-synchronize where they left off at the time of the disconnection by exchanging the TISeq and TIAck numbers. The peers also use the TISeq and TIAck numbers to establish new mappings from the old transport-independent sequence space to the new transportdependent sequence space.
C. Backward Compatibility
End hosts advertise that they implement the isolation boundary by specifying the flow option in a TCP header. If both hosts specify the flow option, then the functionality of an isolation boundary is enabled. If either host is unable to support the isolation boundary for any reason, they will not supply the flow option during connection establishment, and hence, both will continue to connect without the isolation boundary, thus maintaining backward compatibility.
Even when some overzealous middleboxes strip off unknown TCP options, compatibility is still maintained because hosts that do not implement the isolation boundary will behave the same as before while hosts that do implement the isolation boundary will be led to believe that the other host does not and hence fall back to legacy behavior.
In this way, backward compatibility is maintained, and there is no requirement that all hosts be updated simultaneously.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented the isolation boundary in the FreeBSD 8.1 kernel. A summary of the changes follows: 1,156 lines added in 55 locations, 58 lines deleted in 34 locations, and We defer discussing the details due to lack of space but invite the interested reader to peruse the source code, which will be made available under the BSD license, and submitted for inclusion in the kernel. Our test environment consists of three Dell PE2650 servers running FreeBSD 8.1. The servers each have dual Intel Xeon SMT processors with a frequency of at least 2.0 GHz and hyperthreading turned on. They also have 4 GB of DDR2 RAM and a bus speed of 533 MHz and are connected by 1 Gbps Ethernet. The average throughput measured with iperf is 940 Mbps for the legacy TCP stack. Two of the servers are configured as a client and a server. The third is configured as a WAN emulator using dummynet.
We now turn our attention to evaluating the backward compatibility, correctness, and performance of the implementation.
A. Backward Compatibility and Correctness
There are two cases to consider in ensuring backward compatibility with legacy TCP: a modified sender connecting to an unmodified receiver and an unmodified sender connecting with a modified receiver. We use SSH as an example and show traces of connection establishment using tcpdump, which has been modified to display the new TCP option.
Trace 1 shows the three-way handshake during connection establishment between a sender that wants to establish an isolation boundary and a receiver that does not. The flow option is displayed in bold face. The SYN packet uses the flow option to convey a partial TIFID and an initial TISeq. The TIAck is zero as there is nothing to acknowledge yet. The SYN+ACK packet does not contain a flow option, since the receiver does not implement the isolation boundary or is unable set one up at this time. As a result, the sender does not set the flow option in the ACK packet and both hosts communicate without an isolation boundary.
In the case of an unmodified sender talking to a modified receiver, the receiver is made aware that the sender does not implement (or has decided not to set up) the isolation boundary when it receives the SYN packet without the flow option being set. Therefore, it does not set the flow option in the SYN+ACK packet it sends, and the connection proceeds without the isolation boundary. We omit the trace for this case as it is exactly the same as legacy TCP. Now that backward compatibility has been demonstrated, we show the case where both the sender and the receiver implement the isolation boundary. As Trace 2 shows, the sender sets the flow option in the SYN packet. The receiver replies with a SYN+ACK packet containing a flow option with a complete TIFID, its initial TISeq, and the appropriate TIAck. Upon receipt of the reply, the sender knows that the receiver wants to utilize an isolation boundary so it sends an ACK packet with the flow option filled out to confirm that it received the option correctly. This protects the isolation boundary capability in the presence of a middlebox that strips options in one direction and not the other. The connection proceeds utilizing the isolation boundary. The TCP flow option is no longer included in any other packets of the connection.
B. Overhead Incurred by the Isolation Boundary
Because the flow option added to TCP to support the isolation boundary is only transmitted on the wire during connection setup, i.e., during the three-way handshake, we expect any additional overhead would be most observable as an increase in setup time during that phase. (During the operation of the connection, there is a small amount of processing needed to keep TISeq and TIAck in synchronization with their TCP counterparts, but the effect is minimal as we will show.)
1) Overhead during establishment:
The instructions added to the kernel increase the time it takes to establish a TCP connection. The amount of additional work that is done is small, so the effect should also be small.
There are two challenges in measuring the time it takes to establish a TCP connection so that a comparison can be made. First, precisely measuring the overhead requires kernel instrumentation, which is tedious to set up and has the potential to perturb the normal operation of the kernel, thereby obscuring the values being measured. Second, the overhead occurs on both the initiator of communication and the responder. Measuring elapsed time in a distributed control system, such as TCP, is further complicated by the fact that the clocks on the end hosts are in only loosely synchronized when compared with the magnitude of the values being measured.
The first concern is addressed by measuring times in userspace code under the assumption that (on average) both the extended and legacy TCP stacks should see the same perturbations from unrelated processing on the hosts. This assumption is supported by the low variance seen on repeated measurements.
The second concern is addressed by taking both time stamps on the same host. A simple client and server are used to create a connection. A time stamp is place in the client code just before the call to connect whereupon the client immediately blocks on recv. The server immediately closes the connection upon returning from accept causing the recv on the client to return without reading any data. The client then closes its socket. Except for the processing that occurs on the final FIN packet from the client to the server, acquiring time stamps in these locations brackets all the additional processing that is done on both the client and the server in the isolation boundary implementation. Subtracting the elapsed time for establishing a connection with extended TCP stack from the elapsed time for the legacy stack gives the overhead. The average overhead was computed over a large enough number of runs that the half width of the 95% confidence interval is below 5%.
The average time between time stamps without the isolation boundary mechanism is 1.168 ± 0.054 msec while the average with the mechanism is 1.148 ± 0.045 msec. Based on the overlapping confidence intervals, we conclude that the increase in overhead for connection establishment is negligible.
2) Overhead during data transfers: For each packet received, the TISeq and TIAck values must be updated to advance at the same rate as the corresponding TCP variable to which they are logically bound. This adds a small amount of code that is executed only when the isolation boundary is in use. We quantify the cost of the additional code by comparing the time it takes to transfer an amount of data using iperf both with and without the isolation boundary. The first set of results is run between two real hosts on a gigabit Ethernet. The average data bandwidth with a generic kernel was 940.3 ±1. 4 Mbps while the bandwidth with the modified kernel was 940.6 ±0.2 Mbps. In both cases, the TCP traffic saturated the network so it is impossible to tell if the isolation boundary decreased performance of the TCP connection since TCP processing was not the bottleneck.
In order to explore TCP processing as the bottleneck we configured iperf to use the loopback interface. In order to mitigate memory BW as the bottleneck we reduced the MTU such that TCP chose 2048 bytes as the maximum segment size. This forced a higher packet rate such that per packet processing became the bottleneck. Under these conditions the generic kernel acheived a bandwidth of 916.4 ±1.9 Mbps and the modified kernel acheived a bandwidth of 915.1 ±2.2 Mbps. All results were computed at the 95% confidence level.
While the isolation boundary may incur a small performance cost, we were unable to verify this with statistical significance. In all but extreme cases, TCP processing is not the bottleneck, and users will not perceive any degradation in TCP performance when the isolation boundary is in use.
C. Time to Reconnect
Although the isolation boundary enables automatic reconnection when a middlebox loses state, reconnection must be fast enough to remain transparent to the user or application. As above, there is the issue of finding a common time base in a distributed system in which to estimate the reconnect time. Unlike measuring the connection overhead, we cannot use the client/server approach to bound the time since the application is unaware that its TCP connection has failed. 2 Instead, we use the tcpdump time stamps on the SYN and ACK packets of the three-way handshake in a trace taken on the originating host as our sources of time. The difference between the two time stamps is an estimate of the reconnection time. We also measure the setup time for a legacy connection as a baseline. As expected, because reconnection causes a packet exchange, the time for a client to reconnect is a function of the round-trip time (RTT), as evidenced in Figure 3 . It takes about one RTT for the initiator of the reconnection to reestablish the connection and one and a half RTT for the receiver to do the same. Because we are measuring time from the perspective of the sender, the reconnect time should be less than the 1.5 * RTT needed to establish a TCP connection on the receiver. Except for the highest RTT measured, the reconnection time of the extended TCP stack is indistinguishable from the connection setup time of the legacy stack. For an RTT of 95.75 ± 0.11 ms, as shown in the inset, the reconnection time is 96.26 ± 0.13 ms while the connect time is 95.80 ± 0.16 msec. The difference is significant at the 95% confidence level. For most applications, a difference of 0.46 ms should be acceptable. We have yet to optimize the code and expect that it can be further reduced.
V. RELATED WORK
Although middleboxes violate the end-to-end principle, they are accepted for the features they provide. Consequently we 2 We simulate failure by accessing a custom sysctl variable that calls a kernel function to disconnect the "failed" TCP connection and re-synchronize the TI-flow with a new TCP connection. see conscious effort by the networking community to facilitate deployment of middleboxes, in a manner that retains their benefits while minimizing their drawbacks [7] , [8] .
At present, two approaches exist to mitigate the challenges introduced by middleboxes: (1) explicit control of the middleboxes (e.g., middlebox communication (MIDCOM) [2] , [9] , and IETF Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) [10] ); and (2) traversing the middleboxes (i.e., without any control relationship between the end host and the middlebox as is in case of IETF Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [11] , Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) [12] , and Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [13] ).
We do not argue that the methods developed to maintain end-to-end semantics without precluding middleboxes are better or lacking. Instead in this paper, we presented the case of the isolation boundary, which enables end hosts to establish an abstract concept of application streams independent of underlying transport. Such a mechanism allows us to accept interactions with middleboxes all the while strengthening the end-to-end nature of the communication. Below we discuss select research towards maintaining end-to-end semantics while accepting middleboxes.
Network researchers have been studying interaction of endhosts with middleboxes [2] , [9] . Here, the authors argue that middleboxes should be application agnostic -i.e., they should not be required to maintain application intelligence to assist to the fullest. For this reason, they propose an architecture and a framework to allow trusted entities -referred to as MIDCOM agents -to assist middleboxes in meeting their objectives without incorporating application intelligence in the middleboxes. The MIDCOM agents may reside on endhosts, proxies or application gateways depending upon the circumstances. In contrast to MIDCOM the isolation boundary establishes a higher level concept -a transport independent flow -which allows us to maintain end-to-end semantics despite the presence of middleboxes.
Snoeren et al. [4] propose TCP Migrate that maintains end-to-end semantics across IP address changes for mobile clients. Here an abstract token is used to identify the stream, independent of the network attachment point. However, TCP's sequence space is used to describe the stream. This dependence on TCP's sequence space to define the stream, not only creates strong coupling with TCP, but also introduces a possibility of hijacking the communication (which has been acknowledged by the authors). Our abstract sequence space definition does not make the proposal any more vulnerable to hijacking than TCP is today. Defining an abstract sequence space with the isolation boundary, allows us to describe the communication independent of the underlying transport. This allows us to map the application stream to one or more transport streams, which is not possible with TCP Migrate.
Sultan et al. [14] propose M-TCP, a connection migration solution which deals with intermittent connectivity due to failures at the server end. The proposal is to deploy clones of services at different locations in the network, which can exchange communication state as need be. The client initiates a connection migration request from one service instance to the other; the protocol stacks then cooperatively exchange communication state while maintaining end-to-end semantics. The isolation boundary, however, is not limited in scope as M-TCP; either the server or the client can trigger the reconnection (of a disconnected TCP connection, on the same node potentially with a different IP address). Although with the current implementation, the isolation boundary does not implement migration of state to different processes, the isolation boundary does not preclude such mechanisms. In fact we argue that the isolation boundary enables such "high layer services" without compromising backward compatibility.
Another noteworthy effort is that of Salz et al. [15] which features support for end hosts interacting with middleboxes (in this case proxies). Here the authors argue that session layer services are necessary to meet functional requirements such as connection multiplexing, congestion state sharing, applicationlevel routing, mobility management. They present TESLA which builds an abstraction of session layer services allowing the applications to interact with network flows instead of calling functions on the Sockets API. This creates a challenge in maintaining backward compatibility, unlike the isolation boundary which does not alter the Sockets API and therefore applications do not need to be rewritten to benefit from the isolation boundary. The TESLA library maps the incoming logical flow to one transport flow. This allows for seamless migration in the case of a disconnection. The implementation is done by writing event-handlers with a callback-oriented interface. The solution is implemented as a shim layer (using dynamic library interposition) which runs in user space and traps network operations. Performance evaluation (in terms of achievable throughput) of the implementation shows that TESLA does incur overhead, though negligible. However, in case of latency, TESLA performs at par with all application based implementations of session semantics. As with TESLA, by default, the isolation boundary supports resilient transport flows in the face of intermittent connectivity. A prominent difference though is that TESLA is implemented as a user space library while we implement the isolation boundary as part of the TCP/IP stack (kernel) implementation.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have laid out arguments for establishing an isolation boundary in TCP that allows us to restore end-to-end resilience in the presence of middleboxes while maintaining full backward compatibility with legacy TCP. Our realization of the isolation boundary introduces little overhead, and in most cases, it is difficult to observe the performance difference.
One aspect of the isolation boundary which we have not focused on is the second variant of the TCP flow option outlined in our previous work [6] . Instead of providing a stream for application data, it provides a control channel that could be used to allow the end host to negotiate with middleboxes to obtain desired services. In all respects, other than the type of stream, it behaves exactly like the variant discussed in this work. We distinguish between the two with an alternate TCP option tag denoted Flow-D (or data variant) and Flow-C (or control variant). A key property of Flow-C is the extensibility it enables in TCP while also maintaining backward compatibility. Because of lack of space, we leave the discussion of this option and its protocol for future work.
Besides releasing the source code under the BSD license for inclusion in the FreeBSD kernel, we are preparing an RFC for submission to the IETF to stimulate further discussion within the networking community. Also in the spirit of the IETF, we seek collaborators interested in developing independent implementations and joining in interoperability testing.
